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CH A P T E R

270.

(Section 3 amended by 1888, 155.)
AN ACT TO EXTEND AND

REGULATE THE LIABILITY OF EN

PLOYERS TO MAKE COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
SUFFERED BY EMPLOYEES IN THEIR SERVICE.

SECTION I. Where, after the passage of this act,personal injury is caused to an employee, who is himself
in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time,.
(1) By reason of any defect in the

condition of

the ways, works or machinery connected with or used in
the business of the employer, which arose from or had
not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence
of the employer or of any person in the service of the
employer and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing
that the ways, works or machinery were in proper condition; or
(2)

By reason of the negligence of any person in

the service of the employer, entrusted with and exercising superintendence, whose sole or principal

duty

is that of superintendence.
(5)

By reason of the negligence of any person

in the service of the employer, who has the charge or
control of any signal, switch, locomotive engine or
train upon a railroadthe employee,

or in case the

injury results in death, the legal representatives of
such employee, shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if the employee had not been an employee of, nor in the service
of the employer, nor engaged in its work.
Sect. 2. Where an employee is instantly killed or dies
without conscious suffering, as the result of the negligence of an employer, or of the negligence of any
person for whose negligence the employer is liable
under the provisions of this act, the widow of the
deceased, or in case there is no widow, the next of kin,
provided that such next

of kin were at the time of the

death of such employee, dependent upon the

wages of

such employee for support, may maintain an action for
damages therefor and may recover in the same manner,
to the same extent as if the death of the deceased
had not been instantaneous, or as if the deceased had
consciously suffered.

Sect. 5. The amount of compensation receivable under

III

the sum of

Four thousand dollars.

In case of death,

compensation in lieu thereof may be recovered in not
less than five Hundred

and not more than five thousand

dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree
of culpability of the employer herein, or the person
for whose negligence he is made liable; and no action
for the recovery of compensation for injury or death
under this act shall be maintained, unless notice of
the time, place,

and -cause of the injury is

given to

the employer within thirty days, and the action is
commenced within one year, from the occurrence of the
accident causing the injury or death. But no

notice

given under the provisions of this section shall be
deemed to be invalid or insufficient solely by reason
of any inaccuracy in stating the time, place or cause of
the injury: provided,

it

is

shown that there was no

intention to mislead, and that the party entitled to
notice was not in fact mislead thereby.

Sect. 4. Whenever an employer enteres into a contract,
either written or verbal, with an independent contractor
to do part of such employer's work, or whenever such
contractor enteres into a contract with a sub-contractor

to do all

or any part of the work comprised in

such

contractor's contract with the employer, such contract
or sub-contract shall not bar the liability of the
employer for injuries to the employee of such contractor
or sub-contractor, by reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery or plant if they
are the property of the employer or furnished by him,
and if such defect arose or had not been discovered
or remedied, through the negligence of the employer or
of some person entrusted by him with the duty of seeing
that they were in

proper condition.

Sect. 5. An employee or his legal representatives
shall not be entitled under this act, to any right of
compensation or remedy against his employer in any
case where such employee knew of the defect or negligence
which caused the injury, and failed within a reasonable
time to give, or cause to be given, information thereof
to the employer, or to some person superior to himself
in the service of the employer, who had entrusted to
him some general superintendence.
Sect. 6.

Any employer who shall have contributed to

an insurance fund created and maintained for the mutual

purpose of indemnifying an employee for personal injuries for which compensation may be recovered under
this act, or to any relief society formed under Chapter
two hundred and forty-four of the acts of the year
eighteen hundred and eighty-two, as authorized by
Chapter one hunderd and twenty-five of the acts of the
year eighteen hundred and eighty-six, may prove, in
mitigation of the damages recoverable by an employee
under this act, such proportion of the pecuniary benefit
which has been received by such employee from any such
fund or society on account of such contribution of said
employer, as

the contribution of such employer to

such fund or society bears

to the whole contribution

thereto.
Sect. 7. This act shall not apply to injuries caused
to domestic servants or farm laborers by other fellow
employees, and shall take effect on the first day of
September, 1887.

CH A P T E R
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE

125.
CORPORATIONS

TO JOIN CER-

TAIN RELIEF SOCIETIES.
SECTION I.

Any Railroad corporation operating a

railroad or portion of a railroad in this Commonwealth,
may, by vote of its directors, associate itself with
seven or more of its employees in forming a relief
society under the provisions of Chapter
forty-four of the acts of the year

two hundred

eighteen hundred

and eighty two, or may upon the invitation of any
society

formed under said act, become a member thereof,

and may from time to time aid such society by contribution to its funds or otherwise.

The by laws of such

society shall provide for the manner in which the railroad corporation shall vote and be represented in

said

society.
Sect. 2. The funds of such relief society shall not be
liable to attachment under trustee process, execution,
or any other process legal or equitable, because of any
debt or liability of the railroad corporation or of any
member of the society.
Sect. 3.

This act shall take effect upon its passage.

VII

CHAPTER 155.
AN ACT TO AMEND AN ACT TO EXTEND AND REGULATE THE
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS TO MAKE COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES SUFFERED BY EMPLOYEES IN THEIR SERVICE.

Section 1.

Section three of Chapter

two hundred

and seventy of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and
eighty seven is hereby amended by inserting after the
word "death" in the thirteenth line thereof, the following words:-

The notice required by this section shall

be in writing, signed by the person injured or by some
one in his behalf; but if from

physical or mental in-

capacity it is impossible for the person injured to give
the notice within the time provided in said section, he
may give the same within ten days after such incapacity
is removed, and in case of his death without having
given the notice and without having been for ten days
at any time after his injury of sufficient capacity to
give the notice,

his executor or administrator may give

such notice within thirty days after his appointment.
Section 2.

This act shall take effect upon its passage.

VIII.

INTRODUCTION.

Before examining

the provisions

of and the de-

cisions upon the "Employer's Liability Act of the

Great

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, it might be and undoubtedly will be of interest, ( to one who reads the contents
of this thesis), especially if the person

so reading

be a..Massachusetts man" (possibly woman) born and bred
in the old Bay State, to consider some

of the principal

facts and peculiarities of the said State, in order to
see .the necessity of such legislation.
Massachusetts has an area of about 8315

square

miles, and population, according to the last census of
2495345, 300 people to every square mile, who reside in
32 cities and 322 towns.

A statement was once made

that the Governor could see the center of the population
from the State House in Boston, because of the density in
Eastern Massachusetts of the population.

Thirty-two per

cent of the entire state is under cultivation in farms;
and in traveling about the State, either by railroad, or
by

carriage, or as at this time, by that wonderful

machine called the Bicycle, which is now used so ex-

tensively by both rich and poor, one can see the vast
As you go skimming

resources of our Grand Old State.

along, either by means of one locomotion or another, one
will not wonder at all
his own State

why

so dearly.

the Massachusetts Man loves
On all sides you can see

the wonders of nature, and what a great
plays in the works of man.

part

nature

The country is diversified,

up hill and down dale, over bridges of what you consider
small brooks, but at times perfect torrents; through
pasture fields rich with nutriment for the animals which
so peacefully graze thereon; through vast tracts of
wood-land, seeing now and then a Fram House, peacefully
situated in

some retired corner,

expect to see it, and a

where you would never

brown skinned, homey handed

farmer, willing to do all in his power to entertain
you if you happen to stop at his abode.

But I have

not time nor space in this article to extol the beauties
of nature in my native State.
It must be confessed that the soil of Massachusetts
is

not of the best

in

some parts,

and many a farm has

been abondoned, the children either taking to the cities,
where they are either employed in factories or stores,

and not willing to work the "Farm",

or the head of the

family himself removing to some Western State,

seeking

a living out of a soil undoubtedly much worse than that
which he so lately left,

and in

the end returning a much

poorer but wiser man, and willing to brave the barreness
of

the soil and rigor of its winters, to be once more

in his native State.

The farmer may, as I have said,

betake himself to the city and seek for some employment
in

a manufacturing concern, and the manufacturing in-

dustries are both numerous and extensive. There are
about four thousand five hundred establishments, with a
capitalization of over $450,000,000, employing upwards
of

300,000 people, who work very nearly 278 days out of

the 365 days of the year, which is a very good average,
and the amount earned is about $435 by each.

The value

of the goods produced and work done probably exceeds
$600,000,000 annually.

The New England

States, es-

pecially Massachusetts, have some of the largest manufacturing interests in the world, for instance the silk,
cutlery, shoes, clothing, cotton,

paper, etc etc.

has only to take a trip from New York to Springfield
and from Springfield, Mass. to Brattleboro

Vt.,

to

One

realize and appreciate the magnitude of the manufacturing
establishments.

Take for instance, such cities as

Bridgeport, New Haven, Meriden, Hartford, in Conn~ticutt,
and Springfield,

Holyoke,

North Hampton,

and Greenfield,

Lowell, Worcester and many other citits in Massachusetts
noted for the manufacturing establishments.

Thus it is

evident that the facilities for manufacturing must be
great and the advantages of nature wonderful, so that
when brought by the hand of man into subjection,

they act

as an agency by which these establishments are made to
become the principal means by which a very large proportion of the wage earners of

the population make

a comfortable living,

and the manufacturer himself

becomes very wealthy,

often times to the disadvantage of

his employees.
The needs of so large a class of the population
demand the attention of each annual legislature, and among all the recent enactments proposed for the benefit
of this class, none exceeds in importance the Statute
and amendments thereto, which I am about to consider,
and no

single statute has been the basis of so much

litigation and decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court

XII

as this one.
There have been other similar statutes passed in
the different States, and a great number of decisions
thereon, but the time is too limited to compare the
same with the Massachusetts Statute.

The Massachusetts

Statute is, as will be found on comparing the two, the
same as the English Statute, with slight variations.
(See 43 - 44 Vict. C. 42);

therefore it is proper if not

necessary, to begin by considering how the English act
had been construed before our Statute was eacted.
do not suppose

I

that any English Statutes are held to be

in force in Massachusetts, yet the provisions of some
of them and the provisions

of the acts of Parliment

for the punishm nt of other offences have been enacted
in every Stage of our history, and in such cases as well
as where English Statutes respecting civil concerns
have been enacted here, it has always been held;viz.that the construction given previously to the same terms,
by the Engli-h Courts, is the construction to be given
to them by our Courts.
the adjudged

It

is

a common learning that

construction of a statute as to its terms

is enacted as well as to the terms themselves, when an

XIII

act which has been passed by the legislature of one
State or Country is
of another.
statute,

So

afterwards passed by the legislature

when the same legislature in

a later

uses the terms of an earlier one which has

received a judicial construction, that construction is
to be given the later
right,

for if

it

Statute; and this is

manifestly

were intended to excludee any known
S

construction of a previous statute, the legal presumption is that its terms would be so changed as to
that presumption. ( 3 Gray 350.)

effect

Let us look then to

the general scope. By so doing we will see

that it is

plain that it did not attempt to codify the whole law
as to the liability of employees.
act passed in
parliment was

favor of workmen.

It was regarded as an
(a)

This act of

passed for the benefit of workmen, and

the duty of the Court is not to construe it strictly as
against workmen, but in furtherance, of the benefit
which it was intended by parliment.

It was held to be

intended only to remove certain bars to their right to
sue for personal injuries based on their relation to
their employer.

A point of

(a) 12 Q.B.D. 211.

very general application is

XIV

what defenses are now open

to a master when sued by

a workman, under the Employer's Liability Act of 1887.
To determine this it is necessary to bear in mind how
the law stood prior to the passing of the

act.

A servant might have sought redress from a master
for personal injuries subject to any defense the master
might set up, in the following cases : (a) For injuries
sustained by the servant by reason of the negligence of
the master himself.

(b)

For injuries sustained by

reason of the negligence of a servant acting

scope of the master' s employment.

in the

(c) For injuries

sustained by reason of the master having negligently provided defective or dangerous instruments or materials.
To these causes of action the master might have
set up, among others, the following defenses, viz: Traverse of the negligence and contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff.
had irrespective

These defenses the master

of his being master and the plaintiff

being his servant. The master also had, in addition
to the above named defenses, two other defenses arising
from the relative position of servant and master and
peculiar thereto.

He had the defense of what we may

He

term for brevity, the defense of common employment.

had also the defense that the servant had contracted upon
himself the known risks attendant upon the employment.
In what way, then, has the Employer's Liability act of
1887 affected the position of the master

when sued by

a servant or workman under the provisions of that act.
It is enacted in
Jury is caused

section one that

where personal in-

to a workman, the workman

liberty to sue his employer as to the
in

that section,

and that in

acts

shall be at
designated

such actions the workman

shall have the same rights of compensation and remedies
against the employer as if
workman of

nor in

the workman had not been a

the service of the employer nor en-

gaged in his work.

What is the meaning of this ?

Judgment it means

that the workman,

In n,

when he sues his

master under the provisions of the act, for any of the
matters designated,
public suing,

shall be

in the position of the

and shall not be in the position a ser-

vant theretofore was, when he sued his master.
words that the master shall have all

In other

the defenses he

theretofore had against anyone of the public suing him,
but shall not have the special defenses he theretofore
had

when sued by his servant.

What then is the result.

XVI

It

is

this, viz.-

The defense of contributory negligence

is still left to the employer,
mon employment and also the

but the defense of comdefense that

the servant

the known risks

had contracted to take upon himself

attending upon the engagment are taken away from him when
sued by

a workman under the act.

The conclusion is

then, that the legislature, while taking from the employer the two defenses above mentioned, has given him
a statutory defense which
viz: The employer when

did not exist in substance,

sued for a defect in the ways,

works etc. may set up that the servant knew of the
defect and did not communicate it to

him, (the employ-

er) or some other person superior to himself,
man) in the service of the employer.

(the work-

This, if proved,

will avail the employer as a defense, and the only excuse that the workman would have for not communicating
the known defect would be to establish that his master
knew of it.

The legislature has thus taken away two

defenses of the employer, and given him one also.

This

is undoubtedly the true effect of the Employer's liability act.

As heretofore mentioned the Massachusetts

Statute is a decided copy of the English Act, and the

XVII

Massachusetts Legislature was evidently content with the
meaning expounded by the English Parliment, intending
that the Supreme Judicial Court would construe

it lib-

erally in favor of employees. It will be impossible,
owing to the limits of this thesis, to examine the legal
relations between master and servant prior to the Statute
and Judge Holmes says,discussing the provisions of the
Statute: "They cannot be made clearer by discussing the
principles of common law liability, or by referring to
decisions upon a wholly different kind of statute". (a)
The Employer's Liability act, so called, was approved as a law

by Governor Ames, May 14th 1887, and

took effect, according to its section seven, on the
first day of September in the same year.

An excellent

summary of the scope of the statute is given by Judge
Holmes, in the case of Ryalls vs. Mechanics Mills, 150
Mass.190(b)lst. It was an act passed in favor of workmen, but it does not attempt to codify the whole law as
to the liability of employers.

2nd. It was intended only

(a)Engel vs. N.Y. R.R. 160 Mass. 261.
(b) Gilman v. Mechanics Mills, 150 Mass. 190.

XVIII.

to remove certain bars to the workman's right to sue
for personal injuries based on his relation to his
employer, only removing the bars in the cases specified, and impliedly unaffecting defenses not based
upon the relation of master and servant.

3rd.

The

workman's Common Law rights remain unimpaired*
In

1887 it

was law in Massachusetts that masters

were personally bound to see that reasonable

care was

used to provide reasonable safe and proper machinery,
so that if

the duty was

entrusted to another,

and was

not performed, the fact that the proximate cause of the
harm was the negligence of a fellow servant,

was no

defense. (a).
Chief Justice Field has said that it is

settled in

this Commonwealth, that all servants employed by the
same master in

a common service are fellow servants,

whatever their grade and rank. (b).
The rule that one servant cannot maintain an
action against a common master for an injury occasioned
by a fellow servant,
(a)
(b)

rests upon the ground that he takes

Lawler v. C. R. R.R. 136 Mass. 1.
Rogers v. Ludlow Co. 124 Mass. 198-203.

xix

upon himself the natural and ordinary risks incident
to the performance of his service.

The safety of each

says Chief Justice Shaw, in the much cited case of
Farwell v. B. & W. R.R. (a).

depends much on the care

and skill with which each shall perform his appropriate
duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others,
can give notice ofanymisconduct, incapacity or
neglect of duty,

and can leave the service if

the com-

mon employer will not take such precautions, and employ
such agents as the safety of the whole party may require.
Two Statutes were passed to more fully protect
employees in 1886, (b),

and 1887, (c).

The former re-

quired a report of accidEats to employees resulting in
death,

or preventing a return to work in

four days,

to be

sent to the Chief of the District Police by the employer,
violation of which was punished by a fine of Twenty
Dollars.

The latter

for bade an employer to allow

children under the age of fourteen years to clean
machinery in motion, or any machine dangerously near the
moving part, with a fine of Fifty Dollars for violation

(a)
(b)
(c)

Farwell v. B. & R. R.R. 4 Metcalf, 49, b7, 59.
Statutes 1886, 260.
Statutes 1887, 121.

either by the owner or his superintendent.
In

the discussion of the statute which follows,

it will be seen that the bulk of the decisions come
under the first three sections, but we will take up
each clause seperately, preventing needless repition.

In

the cases many of the declarations were drawn with
counts both at common law and under the Statute. (a).
Where such

counts respectively present different issues

and involve different liabllities, it is within the
discretion of the Court to require the plaintiff to
elect whether he will have his case go to the Jury on
the common law counts or as framed in the Statute. (b)
This is quite frequently done in practice.

In all the

cases the word"negligence", frequently occurs, and we
may close this introduction, (which we trust will enable
the reader to form an idea as to the contents of the
work itself), with a definition by Judge Barker in
Wilson v. Steel &c. Co. 163 Mass. 318, of the term: As
that disregard without adequate reason of great and obvious danger which the law holds to be negligence.
(a) Practice act, Mass. Statutes, 167, 82.
(b) Brady vs. Ludlow Co. 154 Mass. 468.

PART

ONE.

THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Statutes of

1887, Chapter 270,and amendments.

An act to extend and regulate the liability of
Employers to make compensation

for personal injuries

suffered by Employees in their service.

BE IT ENACTED, etc. as follows:
Section 1.

Where, after the passage of this act,

personal injury is caused to an employee, who is himself
in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time :(1) By reason of

any defect in the condition of the

ways, works or machinery connected with

or used in the

business of the employer which arose from or had not
been discovered or remedied

owing to the negligence of

the employer of any person in the service

of the em-

ployer and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that
the ways, works or machinery were in proper condition;
or (2) By reason of the negligence of any person in the
service of the employer, entrusted with and exercising
superintendence, whose sole or principal duty is that of
superintendence, or in the absence of such superintendent

of any person acting as superintendent with the authority
or consent

of such employer, or (3) By reason of the

negligence of any

person in the service of the employer

who has the charge or control of any signal, switch,
locomotive engine or train upon a railroad, the employee,
or in case the injury results in death the legal representatives of such employee, shall have the same right of
compensation and remedies against

the employer as if

the employee had not been an employee of nor in the
service of the employer, nor engaged in its work. (a) And
in case such deith is not instantaneous, or is preceded
by conscious suffering, said legal representatives may,
in the action

brought under this section, except as

hereinafter provided, also recover damages for such
death.

The total damages awarded hereunder, both for

said death and said injury, shall not exceed Five
Thousand Dollars, and shall be apportioned by the jury
between the legal representatives and the persons if any,
entitled under the preceding sections of this act, to
bring an action for instantaneous death.

If there are

(a) Amendment of 1892, Chapter 260. Section 1.

no

such persons, then no damages for such death shall

be recovered, and the damages, so far as the same are
awarded for

said death, shall be assessed with refer-

ence to the degree

of culpability of the employer

herein, or the person for whose negligence he is made
liable.

(a)

A car in use by, or in the possession of

a railroad company shall be, considered a part of the
ways, works or machinery of the company using or having
the same in possession, within the meaning of this act,
whether such car is owned by it or by some other company

or person.

(a) Amendment of 1895, Chapter 359.

SECTION I, CLAUSE

The

I.

lawyer who proposes bringing

an action for

personal injuries, must assure himself that the relation
of employer and employee actually existed at the time of
the injury, (a); and that when injured, the employee
was in the exercise of due care and diligence

.

Thus,

plaintiff's intestate was a switchman,and while attending
to his duties was struck by an engine and~killed.

The

plaintiff was non-suited because there was no evidence
that

he was in the exercise of such care and diligence

as was required of him. (b)
Where a workman was injured by the fall of a heavy
bale upon him, which he was helping unload from a truck,
owing to the

sudden forward movement of the trueLk; all

questions as to his due care

were sent to the jury.

In many instances the plaintiff is held to have
assumed the risk

of injury, and though in the exercise

of due care, cannot recover, as where a workman, familiar
with

the business of weaving, undertook to make repairs

outside of his regular duty with the result that his
arm was injured.
(a)
(b)

The Court held that he voluntarily

Dane vs. Cocrane Co.,164 Mass 457.
Shea vs. B & M R.R. 154 Mass. 31.

assumed the risk of an obvious danger. (a)
A brakeman was killed while attempting to
in making a "flying switch".

assist

The evidence showed that

there was nothing defective in the equipment, and the
plaintiff could not recover because of failure to show
that the acts of the deceased did not contribute to the
injury.

(b)

Unguarded machinery is an obvious dangerand in a
recent case where the plaintiff, who was twenty-seven
years of age, familiar with
worked in

the business, and had

a certain room for four months was injured by

uncovered gearing, he could not recover. (c)
But the circumstances of each case vary widelyand
the question of due care is submitted to the jury,
under proper instructions from the presiding judge. If
an employee had a right to expect due care from his
employer as to his permanent appliances, and there was
evidence that he was employed to do what he was doing,
and that his position was seen by his employer, and it

(a) Mahoney vs. N.Y.& N.E.Co. 160 Mass. 573.
(b) Mellor vs. Merchant's Co. 150 Mass. 362.
(c) Brown vs. NY.Y & N.E. R.R. 158 Mass. 247.

may be that

the doing of his work required him at

moments to be in the position he was in when injured,
the Supreme Court cannot say as matter of law that the
plaintiff was negligent in being where he was. (a)
The words, "ways, works and machinery"

are broad

enough it would seem, to cover any and all portions of
the employer's property.

There are a large number of

decisions which may be most compactly grouped as to,
First, What are ways, works etc. ?

and, Secondwhat are

not ?
First: What are Ways, Works, or Machinery ?
This phrase must be understood to mean such ways, works
etc. as are connected with or used in the business of
the employer by his authority and subject to his control.
It may not be necessary in order to render an employer
liable for

an injury occuring to an employee through a

defect in the ways, works etc.

that they should belong

to him, but it should at least appear that he has the
control of them and that they are used in his business,
by his authority, express or implied. (b)

(a) Graham vs. Badger, 164 Mass. 48.
(b) Roberts vs. Wallace, Emp. Liab. act, 249,250.

In a late case the plaintiff was injured by the
fall of a

staging, which was erected by the side of a

wood pile, for the purpose of enabling the workmen to
pile the wood higher.

It was used in one place for a

few days and then moved along. Held, That it was compet ent for the jury to find

that the staging when

erected, was a part of the defendant's ways and works.
The

superintendent ordered a load of wood to be placed

upon the staging at one time while the custom was to
put half a load. It

did not appear that the plaintiff

understood and appreciated the danger of injury from
working on the staging so far that he could be said to
have assumed the risk. (a)
A wire

which is part of the electric signal system

of a railroad has been held to be a part of the ways,
works or machinery.

In attending to his duties, the

plaintiff tripped and fell over this wire, and all
questions of his negligence or due care were sent to the
jury. (b)

(a)
(b)

Prendible vs. Conn. R. Mfg. Co. 160 Mass. 131.
Broulette vs. Conn. R.R.R.Co. 162 Mass. 198.

What are not "Ways, Works or Machinery".
A flight of movable stairs

leading into and intended

to furnish permanent means of access to a cellar. The
plaintiff was employed by the defendants and was ordered
to carry a bar of iron into the cellar. In descending
the stairs he fell and was injured owing to the stairs
giving away. Held, Defendants did not

adopt the stairs

as a "way" used in their business within the statute.(A)
Rubbish on the floor which caused a staging to tip
and throw a workman

has been held no defect in the

"ways", and the plaintiff could not recover either at
common law or under the Statute. (b)
In a similar case the plaintiff fell over a pile
of unfinished work, and thrust his hand into a planer.
It was held that there was no ground that any one knew or
appreciated whatever danger there was more fully than
the plaintiff. (c)
A projecting awning on a depot does not constitute
a defect in the "ways", when the awning is in proper

(a) Regan vs. Donovan, 159 Mass. 1.
(b) O'Connor vs Neal, 153 Mass. 281.
(c) May vs. Whittier Machine Co. 154 Mass. 29.

condition,

and no action could be maintained for his

injuries by an experienced brakeman who struck the
awning. (a)
The liability of a bank of earth to fall because
not

shored up does not constitute a defect in the ways

and works of a permanent character. (b)
A track in the yard of a manufacturing company
owned and repaired by it, used by a railroad for the
delivery of freight is

no part of the railroad's ways.(e)

An exploder of copper filled with

fulminate of

mercury designed to be discharged by electricity, is not
a part of the "ways" etc. and there is no duty on the
part of the employer to inspect such explosives. (d)
Where there is no defect in the material or construction of a staging, the presence of a stone upon it
by the falling of which personal injuries are occasioned
to a workman is not a defect within the meaning of this
section. (e)

(a)
(b)
(c)
d(
(e)

Fiske vs. Fitchburg R.R. 158 Mass 238.
Lynch vs. Allyn, 160 Mass. 249.
Engel vs. N.Y. P. & B. R.R. 160 Mass. 260.
Shea vs. Wellington, 163 Mass. 364.
Carroll vs. Wilcutt, 163 Mass. 221.

The phrase

"Connected with or used in the business

of the employer" cannot be taken literally, but when
used in connection

with "ways, works" etc. must be

understood to mean

ways,

works,

or machinery connected

with or used in the business of the employer by his
authority and subject

to his control.

Thus,

the occas-

ional use by each of two railroad companies of the track
of the other in

delivering or taking cars in

the course

of business will not, to that extent, make the track
of each company part of the ways, works or machinery
of the other, and it would be unreasonable to compel
each company to have and take cars at the precise point

of connection, at the peril, if it did not do so, of
becoming liable for injuries resulting from any defect
in

the track of the other.

(a)

The Court has intimated that the

Statute does not

take away the rights of parties to make such contracts
as they choose which will establish their resective
rights and duties, saying that they have no doubt that
one

may expressly contract to take the obvious risks of

danger from inferior or defective machinery as well
(a) Trash vs. O.C. R.R. 156 Mass. 298.

since the Statute as before. (h)
It has also been held that when a person enters
the service of another, he

impliedly agrees to assume

all the obvious risks of the business, including the
risk of injury from the kind of machinery

then openly

used, and it is immaterial whether he examined the
machinery before making his contract or not. (b)
Whether a dangerous method of doing business constitutes a defect in the

"ways, works" etc. of an

emplbyer, within the meaning of the statute, quare. (c)

EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACTSECTION ICLAUSE 2.
This clause is often discussed

in suits brought

under the statute, because it offers an important defense to the employer.
We may group the cases under two heads: First; Who
are superintendents, and, Second; Who are not superintendents.

It will be seen that the Court

regard a workman

refuses to

as a superintendent unless he has in

(a) 158 Mass. 135.
(b) Rooney vs. Sewall Co. 161 Mass. 153.
(c) 164 Mass. 523.

fact a right to direct and control inferior employees.

WHO ARE SUPERINTENDENTS ?
A foreman having authority to employ and dismiss
men, who has charge of a Job, gives all the directions
to the men, does not work and is not expected to work
with his own hands, is a person whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence, although there is
a general superintendent over him. (a)
A section foreman in

the employ of a railroad,

having charge of a gang of men,
receipts, check freight, etc.

whose duty it

is

to take

is a person whose prin-

cipal duty is that of superintendence.

(b)

The foreman of a gang of men digging a sewer trench
(c); the workman in charge of the blasting at a quarry,
(d)

are superintendents.
The person in charge of repairs on a railroad

track is a person exercising superintendence, and must
warn his gang of the approach of trains when they are
working together, (e),
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

but when the men are seperated,

McPhee vs. Scully,163 Mass. 216.
Mahoney vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 160 Mass. 573.
Hennesy vs. Boston, 161 Mass. 502.
Malcolm vs. Fuller, 152 Mass. 160.
Davis vs. N.Y. N.H. & H.R.R. 159 Mass. 532.

as in different parts of a yard, the superintendent is
not required

to warn each workman, but each must look

out for himself.

(a)

In Conroy vs. Clinton (b) the plaintiff's intestate
was paid higher wages to superintend, and traced the
trench himself in which he was killed. Held; there could
be no recovery.
The employer is not answerable for the negligence
of a person intrusted with superintendence, who at the
time and in doing the act complained of, is not exercising superintendence, but is engaged in mere manuel
labor, the duty of a common workman.

The law recognizes

that an employee may have two duties;

that he may be a

s-uperintendent for some purposes, and also an ordinary
workman and that if he is negligent in the latter
capacity, the employer is not answerable unless the
act itself is one of discretion or oversight, tending
to control others and to vary their situation or action
because of his discretion.

For the negligence of such

a person in doing the mere work

of an ordinary workman,

(a) Lynch vs. B.& A.R.R. 159 Mass. 536.

(b) 158 Mass. 318.

in which there is no exercise of superintendence, the
employer is not made responsible by the Statute. (a)

WHO ARE NOT SUPERINTENDENTS.
In

England,

the Statute do es not apply to a mere

laborer working under or with others, even though it
may be a part of his duty to look after and attend to
certain instrumentalities. (b)
A person

"at work pretty much all the time in

getting out lumber, pi{ing it up or arranging i% and
in operating saws", is not a superintendent. (c)
An ordinary weaver whose usual work is merely to
operate a loom, is not a person entrusted with and
exercising superintendence merely because

it is also

his duty, when his loom gets out of repair to notify the
loom fixer to put it in order, because the loom fixer
and weaver are fellow servants. (d)
In Dowd vs. B. & A.R.R. (e) the plaintiff was
injured by being struck by a cement pipe which rolled off

(a) Cashman vs. Chase, 156 Mass. 342.
(b) See Gibbs vs. G.W.R.R. 12 Q.B.D. 208.
(c) O'Brien vw. Rideout, 161 Mass. 170.
(d) Roseback vs. Etna Mills, 158 Mass. 579.
(e)
162. Mass. 185.

from the roof of a round-house which was being repaired
by the defendant's workmen, and recovery was denied because the person in charge of the repairs was not a superintendent.
Where a workman attended to fires under a boiler,
sharpened tools, charged and cleared out drill holes,
which acts took most of his time, the Court refused to
consider him as a superintendent.
"In a sense it is
is

Judge Lathrop said

undoubtedly true that superintendence

more important than manuel labor, and so if super-

intendence is entrusted to a man who also works with
his hans,

it

may be said that his principal duty is

that of superintendence. But if the statute had intended
that every person exercising superintendence should not
be considered a fellow servant with a person injured,
there would have been no need of the words "whose sole
or principal duty is

that of superintendence".

These

words must have a reasonable intrepretation given to
them and a majority of the Court is
it

of the opinion that

cannot be said of a person who woik s at manuel labor

to the extent shown in this case, that his principal
duty is that of superintendence.

(a.

(a) O'Neill vs. O'Leary, 164 Mass. 388.

Where a superintendent accidentally moved an

iron

beam which fell through a hole in the floor and injured
the plaintiff,

who was working below,

was allowed to go to the jury.
the jury would be warranted in

the plaintiff

The Court held that
finding that the negligence

of the superintenddnt caused the accident. (a)
The sudden jolt of an oil tank on a freight car
which caught and injured the plaintiff's hand, will
not permit of a recovery against the company where
there is

no evidence

of negligence

an the part of the

engineer in failing to stop, start, manage or control
the train properly.

(b)

Where a pile of hay fell and there was no evidence
that the defendant's superintendent piled it or had
anything to do with it,
it

there was

could be inferred that it

fell

nothing from which
because of the super-

intendent's negligence. (c)
No action can be maintained against a city

for

the alleged negligence of the assistant superintendent
of streets. (d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

McCauley vs. Norcross, 155 Mass. 584.
Graham vs. B& A.R.R. 156 Mass. 4.
Fitzgerald vs. B.& A.R.R. 156 Mass. 293.
McCann vs. Waltham, 163 Mass. 344.

When it

is

a part of the ordinary duties of masons

to build their staging without special orders, they
cannot complain if

the staging falls

that the superin-

tendent neglected to instruct them as to how it should
be built. (a)
The employer is not liable

under this clause for

the negligence of his superintendent in furnishing his
employee with a defective appliance if the employer
owes no duty to his employee to have the appliance inspected in regard to its construction before use
if it is no

and

part of the superintendent's business to

make such inspection unless he assumes so to do

with

his employer's knowledge and consent, as a part of the
work which as superintendent he is employed to do. (b)
Where the negligence of a superintendent is relied
upon, the negligence must occur not only during the
superintendence, but in the exercise of it. (c)

(a) Burns vs. Washburn, 160 Mass. 457.
(b) Shea vs. Wellington, 163 Mass. 364.
(c)
160 Mass. 248.

SECTION I, CLAUSE

This clause has to do

3.

with the right of recovery

for personal injuries sustained owing to the negligence
of persons in charge of railroad appliances.

While the

life of a railroad man is dangerous, few decisions have
involved the construction of this clause.
of a train, as defined by the Court,

The meaning

is a number of

cars coupled together, forming one connected whole, and
moving from one point to another upon a railroad in the
ordinary course of traffic, under an impetus imparted
to them by a locomotive engine, although the engine may
have been detached. (a)

But a locomotive engine in a

railroad round house for repairs, is not upon a railroad
within this clause of the statute. (b)
In one case it was shown to be customary to examine
trains in motion, and the plaintiff was inspecting such
a train when another train Came upon him suddenly and
injured him.

There was a brakeman on the train who

should have warned the plaintiff.

Held, that it was not

(a) Caron vs. B& A.R.R. 164 Mass. 523.
(b) Perry vs. O.C.R.R. 164 Mass. 296.

necessary that the person in charge be a conductor, if he
had control for the time being. (a)
means that some

"Charge or control"

person, for the time being at least,

has immediate authority to direct the movements and
management of the train as a whole, and of the men
engaged upon it.

It is not necessary that the person

should be upon the train itself, and it is possible that
more than one person may have charge at the same time.(b)
At the present time a car in use by or in
possession of a railroad company is

the

a part of the ways,

works or machinery of the company using or having the
same in possession, whether owned by it
company.

or by some other

Where there is evidence of too much lateral

motion of the draw bars of

a car which was neglected

or overlooked by the inspector, the question of proper
care is for the jury.(d)

In an earlier case an empty

freight car, while being shifted upon a connecting line,
was

held not to be a part of the ways, works etc. and

for an injury caused by a defective brake wheel to a

Steffe vs. O.C.R.R. 156 Mass. 262.
(b) Bowers vs. Conn. R.R. 162 Mass. 312.

brakeman upon the car, no recovery could be had against
the company using it. (a) (See the amendment,Statute
1893. Chapter 359.)

PART II.
SECTION TWO. ACTION BY WIDOW OR NEXT OF KIN WHEN INSTANTANEOUS DEATH.
"Where an employee is instantly killed, or dies
without conscious sutffering, as the result of the negligence

of an employer,

or of the negligence of any

person for whose negligence the employer is liable under
the provisions of this

act, the widow

of the deceased,

or in case there is no widow, the next of kin, provided
that such next of kin were at the time of the death of
such employee dependent upon the wages of such employee
for support, may maintain an action for damages

therefor

and may recover in the same manner, to the same extent,
as if the death of the deceased

had not been instantan-

eous, or as if the deceased had consciously suffered."

The Court construes the, words "without conscious
suffering" strictly.

The employee,

if

not instantly

(a) Coffee vs. N.Y.N.H. & H.R.R. 155 Mass. 21.

killed, must die without recovering consciousness.
Hodnet vs. B.& A. R.R. (a),

In

the injury was suffered at

11:10 A. M., and death followed at I P.M., leaving to
conjecture whether he

regained consciousness or not.

This was held not a sufficient compliance with the
statute, for it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove
that the death thus actually took place

and also that

she was dependent upon the wages of the deceased for
support.

In another case, the plaintiff's

husband

was crushed between two cars while he was inspecting
pins, couplings etc. in the performance of his duty,
owing to a car being negligently sent against those he
was inspecting .

The evidence showed that deceased was

in the exercise of due care while the conductor was
negligent.

The man was crushed, but a witness testified

that he took two or three steps and then fell.

The

court said this did not necessarily imply any voluntary
action or consciousness on his part. (b)
Where a brakeman was killed by coming in contact

(a) 156 Mass. 86.
(b) Mears vs. B.& M.R.R. 163 Mass. 150.

with a bridge while riding on the top of a tall freight
car because the "tell tales" were out of repair, the train
running twenty miles per hour,

the inference was that

death was instantanwous or that he died without conscious suffering. (a)
This section gives a right of action to the widow
or next of kin, without indicating anything as to the
mode of assessing damages. But the fact that they are
dependent upon the wages of the deceased for support
must be shown, or the action cannot be maintained.
There is no difficulty in showing that a widow was dependent upon the wages of a husband

,

and a daughter

who lived with her father, receiving all his wages,
keeping house for him and for her brothers, although
the brothers paid her for their board, is"dependant"
within the meaning of this section. (b)
In Lathrop vs. Fitchburg R.R. (c) the next of kin
of a brakeman sought to recover for his death. He was
killed while coupling cars on which long timbers

were

loa ed, the ends projecting beyond the cars, and crushing
(a) Maher vs. B.& A.R.R. 158 Mass. 36.
(b) Houlihan vs. Conn.R.R.R. 164 Mass. 555.
Lathrop vs. Fitchburg R.R. 150 Mass. 423.

his head. It

was admitted that he could have avoided

the danger by stooping, and the court refused to maintain the action because he was not in the exercise of
In a similar case a conductor was struck on

due care.

the head and killed.
Statute,

The accident happened before the

but the Court held that having assumed the

risk of what he did, no action could be maintained
against the Company.

(a)

The mere fact that after the accident precautions
were taken to prevent a recurrence is not admissable
in favor of a plaintiff whose husband was
caving in

killed by the

of a trench, either at common law or under

the Statute. (b)
In trying an action under this section where the
intestate left as his sole next of kin a sister who was
"dependent" upon him, and a brother who was self supporting,

the action should properly be brought in

name of the sister

alone.

(c)

(a) Boyle vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 151 Mass. 102.
(b) Shinners vs. Proprieters etc. 154 Mass. 168.
(c)Daly vs. N.J. Co. L55 Mass. 1.

the

In this case the sister was unable to work regularly
or to earn

enough to pay her doctor's bills,

md had

received from her deceased brother from $30 to $35 per
month for three or four years, and the Court very properly considered her "dependent".

PART III.
SECTION THREE.

LIMIT AND AMOUNT OF COMPENSATIONNOTICE

OF TIME, PLACE, AND CAUSE, LIMITATION OF ACTION AND
INACCURACY IN THE NOTICE.

(Except in actions brought by the personal representatives, under section one of this act, to recover
damages for

both the injury and death of an employee) (a)

the amount of compensation receivable under this act in
cases of personal injury

shall

-not exceed the sum of

Four thousand dollars. In case of death ( which follows
instantaneously or without conscious suffering) (a),
compensation in lieu thereof may be recovered in not
less than Five Hundred and not more than Five Thousand
dollars, to be assessed with reference

(a) Amended by Statute 1888, Chap. 155.

to the

degree

of culpability of the employer herein, or the person for
whose negligence he is made liable, and no action for
the recovery of compensation for injury or death under
this act shall be maJintained unless notice of the time,
place and cause of the injury is given to the employer
within thirty days and the action is commenced within
one year from the occurrence of the accident causing the
injury or death. (a)

(The notice required by this

section shall be in writing signed by the person injured
or by some one in his behalf; but if from phystcal or
mental incapacity it is impossible for the person injured
to give the notice within the time provided in

said

section, he may give the same within ten days after
such incapacity is removed and in case of his death,
without having given the notice and without having been
for ten days at any time after his injury of sufficient
capacity to give the notice, his executor or administrator may give such notice within thirty days after his appointment), but no
of this section

(a)

notice given under the provisions
shall be deemed to be invalid or

Amended by Statute 1888, Chapter 155.

insufficient solely by reason of any inaccuracy in
stating the time, place or cause of the injury, provided
it is shown that there was no intention to mislead and
that the party entitled to notice was not in fact mislead thereby.

The Legislature wisely put a limit to the amount
which can be recovered for personal

injuries. Many

causes of action arise where a jury would make a heavy
award of damages owing to the shocking nature of the
accident

and the apparent heartlessness of the cor-

poration. In Massachusetts, the damages awarded are for
"compensation" alone and in no case are vindictive or
punative damages allowed. (a)
The administrator of an employee

has no right of

action against the employer for causing the employee's
death in addition to the right as legal representative
to recover damages

accruing to the intestate in his

lifetime, but this section settles the amount to be
recovered, first in cases

under section 1, second in

(a) See Burt vs. Adv. Co. 154 Mass. 245.

cases under section

2. (a)

In bringing suit

the Practice Act, so called, renecessary to constitute

quires that substantial facts

the cause of action be stated, with substantial certainty and without unnecessary verbage.

Evidence need

not be set forth in the declaration for if the declaration does not give the defendant reasonable knowledge
of the nature and grounds of the action, he may apply
to the Court for a bill of particulars. (b)
The giving of notice to the employer is a condition
precedent of the employee's

right to recover.

This

notice need not go into details but must accurately
state the time, place and cause of the injury.
notices required by the statute are not to be

All
construed

with technical strictness, but enough should appear in
them to show that they are intended as the basis of a
claim against the city,

town ( or corporation) and are

given on behalf of the person who brings the suit.
In Dolan vs. Alley et al,

(6), the plaintiff was

(a) Ramsdell vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 151 Mass. 245.
(b) Pub. Stats. Chap. 167. Sec. 2, 61.
(c) Driscoll vs. Fall River, 163 Mass. 108.

(d)

(c)

153 Mass. 380.

injured by the falling in of a roof and steam pipes
fastene.d thereto,

caused

by the accumulation of snow

on the roof, which the defendant's superintendent had
negligently failed to remove.

Notice was duly given

signed by the attorneys for the plaintiff.

This was

held sufficient by the Court and the plaintiff

recovered.

The notice required may be given by some one in the
intestate's behalf within thirty days from the occurrence of the accident or by his executor or administrator

within thirty days after his appointment.

widow may give

the notice .

The

(a)

The appointment of the executor or administrator
is

made by the probate Court and it

seems that the no-

tice must be given within thirty days after the appointment,

although' the appointment is

bond has been

not complete until a

filed. (b)

The intention is that the employer may know whether
he must defend or settle a suit at an early date.
This
(a)
(b)

question has been somewhat discussed by the

Daly vs. N.J.Co. 155 Mass. 1.
Gustafsen vs. W. & M. Co. 153 Mass. 468.
Smith's Probate Law. p. 108.

Court in two recent decisions. (a)
There must not be delay in serving the notice,
for where the notice was not served until after the
writ was made in an action for injuries, although the
notice was left at the defendant's house on the same
day the writ was dated, the action could not be

main-

tained. (b)
It is not necessary to

refer to the defendant's

superintendent or other person in charge or to his conduct,

where the cause of the injury is
In Beauregard vs. Webb Co.

(c)

properly stated.
the notice stated

that the cause of the injury was the fall of stones from
a derrick on the deceased, through the nmgligence of the
defendant or its du1lerintendent.

Held; that the notice

was ei-ther sufficient in itself, or the jury might have
found it sufficient on the ground that there was na
intention to mislead and that in fact the defendant was
not mislead by it.
(a) Jones vs. B.& A.R.R. 157 Mass. 51.
Dickerman vs. O.C.R R. 157 Mass. 52.
(b) Veginan vs. Morse 160 Mass. 143.
160 Mass. 201.
(c)

PART IV.
SECTION FOUR.

LIABILITY IN CASE OF SUB CONTRACT: WHEN.

Whenever an employer enters into a contract, either
written or verbal, with an independant contractor to do
a part of such employer's work, or whenever such contractor enters into a contract with a sub-

contractor

to do all or any part of the work comprised in such
contractor's contract with the employer, such contract
or sub contract shall not bar the liability of the employer for injuries to the employees of such contractor
or sub contractor by reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works machinery or plant, if they are
the property of the employer or furnished by him,

and if

such defect arose or had not been discovered or remedied
through the negligence of the enployer or of some person
entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that they
were in proper condition.

The purpose of this section is

to enlarge the lia-

bility of an employer; otherwise it is meaningless. The
inference from the section is

that the employer should

be liable when a contractor does part of his work,

and

an employee of the contractor is injured by a defect
in

the condition of the ways,

works,

machinery or plant

furnished by the employer to the contractor, which has
not been discovered or remedied through

the negligence

of the employer or of some person entrusted by him with
the duty of seeing that they were

in pro~per condition.

By the negligence of the employer, his own negligence
is intended, in distinction from that of his servant or
superintendent, which is included in the latter part of
the sentence.

(a)

PART
SECTION

V.

FIVE. Knowledge of Defect by Employee without

Informing.
An employee or his legal representatives, shall not
be entitled under this c act to any right of compensation or remedy against his employer in any case where
such employee knew of the defect or negligence which
caused the injury and failed within a reasonable time,

(a) See opinion of Morton J. Toomey vs. Donovan,158Mass.208

to give or cause to be given,

information thereof to the

employer or to some person superior to himself in the
service of the employer who had entrusted to him some
general superintendence.
Section

five was intended not to create conditions

precedent which the plaintiff must

show have been com-

plied with before he can maintain an action, but to
give to the employer

a new ground of defense.

The bur-

den of showing which rests upon the defendant. (a)
It would be unjust to compel an employer to pay
for injuries

resulting from defective machinery which

the employee knew about and continued to use without
complaint.

The workman constantly using

the workings of a machine,

is

far more likely to know

of its defects than his employer.
what is a

and witnessing

The question of

"reasonable time" after discovery of the

defect will be left

to the jury.

(a) Connolly vs. Waltham, 156 Mass. 368.

PART VI.
SECTION SIX. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES WHERE EMPLOYEE RECEIVES BENEFIT FROM RELIEF FUND TO WHICH EMPLOYER HAS
CONTRIBUTED.

Any employer who shall have contributed to any
insurance fund created and maintained for the mutual
purpose of indemnifying an employee for personal injury
for which compensation may

be recovered under this

act, or to any releif society formed under Chapter 244
of the acts of 1882 as authorized by Chapter 125 of the
acts of 1886, may prove, in mitigation of damages recoverable by an employee under this act, such proportion
of the pecuniary benefit

which has been received by

such employee from any such fund or society on account
of such contribution od said employer, as a contribution

of such employer to such fund or

society bears to the

whole contribution thereto.

If an employer's business is so hazardous that he
fears that actions may be brought against him under the
statute, he can protect himself under this section.
He may create and maintain an insurance fund,

or

contribute to the societies mentioned in

the Statute

above. Statute 1882 Chapter 244 authorizes the formation
of releif

societies by the employees of railroad and

steamboat corporations, and Statute

1886 Chapter 125

authorizes railroad corporations to join such relief societies.
No case has yet arose calling for an intwrpretation
or construction of this section.

SECTION SEVEN. APPLICATION OF THE ACT LIMITED.
This act shall not apply to injuries caused to
domestic servants or farm laborers by other fellow
employees, and shall take effect on the first day of
September, eighteen hundred and eighty

seven.

It seems that household servants or "hired men"
on a Massachusetts farm, must remain content with the
common law remedy against their employer if
injured.

In

a,

recent case

they are

a laundress who lived

some distance from her employer was now and then
carried by a coachman of the employer to or from her
work. One morning there was not room enough on the seat,

so the plaintiff clambered onto the wagon and sat upon
a camp chair en route, while the horse was being driven
at a "smartish pace", as an English Judge would say.
A sudden turn was made at a corner and the lady thrown
out. Held; in an action against the employer for her
injuries, that she was a fellow servant of the coachman
and could not recover, neither was the employer liable
for her carelessness in riding on such a seat and that
it was her own act which caused the injury. (a)

GENERAL DECISIONS ON THE STATUTE.
Some twenty five cases must be briefly discussed
under this head,

which do not strictly

fall

under any

particular section. The lawyers of the State begn
cautiously

to bring actions under the statute, and some

of the early suits failed because of failure to make
out a case within the Statute.
of

The first case was that

Ashley vs. Hart and another (a) decided in 1888.
The accident happened less than two months after

the Statute took effect. The judges disposed of it with
(a) McGuirk vs. Shattuck, 160 Mass. 45.
(b) 147 Mass. 573.

a short opinion "by the Court", citing no authorities.
The plaintiff was a painter and with another workman,
was painting a house, suspended by a stage.
looked after his end when the
lowered, but the other workman

stage was

Each

raised or

neglected to fasten his

end securely, which, giving away, threw the plaintiff
to the ground.

Held; that the statute does not give

a right of action against

the employer for the negli-

gence of a fellow servant in using or handling a machin
tool, or appliance which is itself in a proper condition.
Here the injury resulted from the negligence of a fellow
servant, thus failing to

state a case within the

statute. The next action failed because the injury had
happened before the Statute took effect. (b)
In the next reported case the plaintiff was an expert machinest, who had accidentally put his hand into
an exposed gearing. Held; that having assumed the risks
of his employment, he could not recover, and further,
no notice as required by the Statute, was given to the
employer. (a)
(al Foley vs. PetteeMach. Wks. 149 Mass. 294.
(b) Dunlap vs. Barney Co. 148 Mass. 51.

The old common law action for personal

injuries

is not barred, and it is not necessary to rely on the
statute

where the common law liability is clear, as

where a laborer employed to unload coal from a boat fell
through a hole and was injured.

He had no

notice of

any defect, and it was held that the defendants owed
him a duty not to injure him after inviting him to
come on board the vessel. (a)
If the relation of Employer and employee did not
exist b:etween the

parties, the action cannot be main-

tained. (b)
The

employer is not liable either at common law

or under the Statute,

for injuries occasioned to any

employee by reason of a defect in a machine or appliance
or of the employer's failure to instruct him respecting
his duties if the only defect relied on had no connection
with the accident and there was no defect or
which it

danger of

was the employer's duty to wqrn the employee or

any particulars in

which the employee

should have been

(a) Coughlin vs. Boston Co. 151 Mass. 92.
(b) Dane vs. Cochrane Co. 164 Mass. 453.

instructed. (a)
In the following cases, the liability was held to
be a question of fact for the jury

where the injuries

caused by a staging alleged as defective. (b)
a car was left

Where

on a track so that only five tracks re-

mained between the car and a passing train (c),

and

where a workman was assisting in pulling a freight car
along on a track on the employer's premises whth his
back to the car.

In crossing a newly opened ditch

under the track he fell and was killed by the car.
ditch was visible but

The

not guarded and no warning of its

existance had been given.

The jury must decide whether

there was a defect in the ways, and whether the deceased
was in
If

the exercise of due care.
the defect or danger is

(d)
apparent to the workman

there can be no recovery, as when a workman had his
hand drawn into a wheel or drum around which a rope
was wound in the storage of ice (e); when a track in-

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Brady vs. Ludlow, 154 Mass. 468.
Brommie vs. Hogan, 153 Mass. 29.
Dacey vs. O.C.R.R. 153 Mass. 112.
Gustafsen vs. W. & M. Co. 153 Mass. 468.
Carbury vs. Downing, 154 Mass. 248.

spector chose to operate his hand car on a railroad
track used by trains going either way,

and proceeded

without lights in his lamps (a); and when no duty rests
upon a railroad to alter certain timbering or planking
by which an employee was injured, the employee

being

familiar with the same, he is held to have assumed the
risk and cannot recover.

(b)

If the law of another State where a personal injury
is

suffered,

allows a recovery,

an action may be main-

tained for the injury in Mass., although the plaintiff
could not have recovered had the accident happened here.
(c).

If, in an action under the statute, for causing

the death of an employee, the evidence introduced is of
such a nature that the questions how the accident
happened and whether the deceased was using due care
can be answered only by conjecture, the action cannot
be maintained. (d)

In Thyng vs.

Fitchburg R.R. (e)

(a) Tyndale vs. 0.C.R.R. 156 Mass. 503.
(b) Gleason vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 159 Mass. 68.
(c) Walsh vs. N.Y.& N.E.R.R. 160 Mass. 571.
Higgins vs. Cent.N.E.etc. R.R. 155 Mass. 176.
(d) Irwin vs. Alley, 158 Mass. 249.
156 Mass. 13.
(e)
Geyette vs. F.R.R. 162 Mass. 549.

a train broke apart and killed a brakeman, owing to the
negligence of those who made up the train in using too
short a pin.

Held; no recovery, because it was the

fault of the fellow employees and not of the employer.
Similar holdings were made where
cleaning a car was thrown

a plaintiff, while

over a seat because the car

was sent violently against

a post. (a), "and where

wovkmen allowed a truck to fall through a hole in the
floor, which injured the plaintiff below. (b)
Also where the plaintiff's

intestate,

with others,

was putting up a telegraph pole which fell across the
railroad track.

In getting the pole off, the deceased

was struck and killed by a train which could not stop
in

time to prevent the accident.

Held;

that there was

no evidence of negligence on the part of the engineer in
failing to stop sooner. (c).

A city is not liable for

the breaking of a defective pole to which were fastened
the fire signal

wires. (d)

The same case that people of ordinary prudence

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Devine vs. B.& A.R.R. 159 Mass. 348.
O'Keefe vs. Brownell, 156 Mass. 131.
Chisolim vs. O.C.R.R. 159 Mass. 3.
Pittingell vs. Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368.

would exercise under the same circumstances is all that
is required of the plaintiff. (a)

But no action either

at common law or under the Statute, could be maintained
for injuries to a plaintiff's intestate who voluntarily
undertook to whitewash

the walls and ceiling of a card

room in a factory. He was cautioned to look out for the
machinery, and was capable of understanding the danger,
yet worked while the machinery was in motion, fell and
was killed. (b)

(a) Brich vs. Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334.
(b) Connelly vs. Hamilton CO, 163 Mass. 156.

CONCLUS ION.

The Employer's Liability Act has been in force for
fully nine years, and as has been seen in briefly discussing the cases there have been some eighty decisions
and with a number of cases undoubtedly yet unsettled.
In many counties the Tort cases are found undoubtedly on every trial list of the Superior Court,
and in most of the trials, exceptions are taken, which
bring the cases before the Supreme Judicial Court for
determination.

Almost one half of the cases arise

from injuries received on Railroads, one fourth in factories,

and one fourth in

other employments.

In

some

cases, perhaps the deserving plaintiff fails to recover,
(owing to some technicality) for his injuries, in most
cases where the Statute has been complied with the
employer is

held responsible for the injury.

This Statute undoubtedly makes the employer of
labor more watchful, and consequently he, (the employer) uses more care and looks after the wellfare of
his employees, (who are at the best not treated any too
well) with due diligence and acts as a prudent man

should in

protecting the life

and limb of the employee.

With' this we will close our subject, adding that
it would seem on the whole, that the work of the Legislature in

the protection of the laboring classes,

has not been in vain, and that the Employer's Liability Act answers a long felt need in that direction,'
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